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FROM CRISIS TO REFORM: LEGAL AID POLICYMAKING IN THE 1990'S
by

Mary Jane Mossman
When money was more readily available, discussions about legal aid concentrated on meeting needs. Now discussionsfocus on controlling costs...
Although this comment about legal aid services in Canada was made back
in 1979, it identifies the beginning of a more conservative shift in legal aid
policy-making that is now clearly evident in From Crisis to Reform: A New
Legal Aid Plan for Ontario, 2 a report funded by the Donner Canadian Foundation. The authors state their objectives directly: to provide practical
recommendations, compatible with the "fiscally conscious 1990's", 3 for
provincial policy-makers to improve the current system. 4 Accordingly, their
Report focuses on the current crisis in legal aid funding in defining the
issues for legal aid services in the 1990s, and on the need to control costs in
recommending solutions. Indeed, even though the quotation above shows
that concerns about legal aid costs are not new, the Report graphically
reveals how a focus on "controlling costs" rather than "meeting needs" may
fundamentally re-shape the policy-making process.
Essentially, the authors make three recommendations: a new form of
governance to replace the Law Society's responsibility for legal aid services,
"fixed budget" funding rather than the "open-ended" system envisaged by
the Legal Aid Act, 1967, 5 and the development of staff lawyer models for
* Professor of Law, York University, Osgoode Hall Law School
I Avrim Lazar "Legal Aid in the Age of Restraint" (Canadian Institute for the

Administration of Justice Conference on the Cost of Justice, Toronto, 1979)[unpublished] at 1. The quotation continued:
"But the objectives of legal aid have not changed - they still relate to meeting
needs. What has changed is the resources available to legal aid. This, like our
newly heightened interest in the costs of justice, is a result of government financial restraint."
As the quotation suggests, issues of financial restraint in legal aid services in Canada

have existed for decades, and not just in relation to Ontario's Plan.
2 F.H. Zemans & P.J. Monahan (Toronto: York University Centre for Public Law and

Public Policy, 1997)[hereinafter "the Report"]. The Report states that the book, "was
funded by the Donner Canadian Foundation. However, the views expressed herein

do not necessarily reflect the views of the Foundation." The Report does not include
a copy of the research mandate for the study, nor any information about the costs
of the study. The research studies for the Report are also being published as a
separate volume.
3 Ibid. at 1.
4 Ibid. at 8. Although the Report clearly states that the authors "have placed the legal
aid client at the centre of [their] analysis", their extensive consultations do not
appear to have included legal aid clients (although some "client representatives"
were included.) For an analysis of some clients' perceptions of legal services, see
W.A. Bogart & N. Vidmar "Problems and Experience with the Ontario Civil Justice
System: A Preliminary Report" in A. Hutchinson, ed., Access to Civil Justice (Toronto: Carswell, 1990) at 1; and other papers in this collection.
5 S.O. 1966, c. 80. See now R.S.O. 1990, c. L-9, as amended by S.O. 1993, c. 16, s.
I; S.O. 1993, c. 27, Sched.; and S.O. 1994, c. 38, s. 37.

(1998), 16 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice
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services currently provided by private practice lawyers with legal aid certificates. For those who have followed legal aid debates in Canada in recent
decades, none of these recommendations represent fundamentally new ideas,
especially since these or very similar arrangements have been in place in
other Canadian provinces, sometimes for many years. In this way, the Report
may disappoint those who had hoped that the Report would address more
fundamental issues, such as principles for defining the kinds of legal aid
services that should be available to clients in the 1990s or factors relevant
to deciding how to allocate scarce legal aid resources more fairly among
competing needs for them. Instead of confronting these difficult questions,
the Report leaves them to be decided by the Board of the proposed new
agency, Legal Aid Ontario. Yet, in practice, since choices about these fundamental issues may constrain other choices (including decisions about the
appropriate composition of the governing Board or the effectiveness of
particular kinds of delivery systems, for example), the Report's failure to
address fundamental principles makes its other recommendations much less
persuasive.
In addition to this practical problem, the Report's failure to examine
fundamental principles results in a more serious problem. It offers recommendations based on the use of one main objective, "controlling costs", an
objective that primarily reflects the short term interests of the provincial
government funder. While no one disputes the relevance of controlling costs
as an objective of legal aid policy-making, an effective process requires
thoughtful balancing of this objective with others,6 and careful assessment
of fundamental principles concerning the public interest in the context of
different and sometimes competing interests among funders, administrators,
lawyers, and clients of legal aid services. In contrast with such an approach,
the Report reveals a narrow governmental emphasis on controlling costs,
thus limiting the scope of its analysis of current problems and proposed
solutions. As a result, even though the Report's recommendations may
appear attractive to the provincial government in the short term, they do not
address all of the issues and interests fundamental to effective policy-mak7
ing about Ontario's legal aid services for the twenty-first century.
6 As noted above, the Report expressly identified its main focus on "practical"
recommendations to improve "the current system". At the same time, the authors
lamented the absence of a "macro-level review" of legal aid services since the Osler
Report twenty years ago and declared their intent to "fill that gap" as well. (See
Ministry of the Attorney General, Report of the Task Force on Legal Aid (Toronto,
1974): Hon. Mr. Justice Osler, Chair.) This recent Report, however, seems to focus
on the goal of recommending changes within the current system rather than offering
a more fundamental assessment. For another example of this difficulty, see supra
note 4.
7 The conclusion that the Report reveals a primary concern for governmental interests
may also raise questions about the study's independence, even though it was undertaken as academic research funded by a private foundation. As well, it may provoke
concerns about the necessity, particularly in the context of the "fiscally conscious
1990's" for another government-funded study of legal aid services to be undertaken
as well. As the Report noted (at page 8), "the provincial government announced [in
late 1996] an independent review of the Ontario Legal Aid Plan, chaired by Professor John McCamus". Professor McCamus was requested to report by I July 1997.
In addition to funding this research, the provincial government requested a review
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Funding
The Report's more limited perspective is evident, for example, in its treatment of the funding issue (Chapter VI). The authors pragmatically accept the
existence of the "fixed budget" funding arrangement adopted by the provincial government and the Law Society of Upper Canada in a Memorandum of
Agreement in September 1994. According to this agreement, the Plan is limited to a defined allocation of funding each year, even though legal aid certificates issued in one year may not be submitted for payment until several years
later, a problem that had previously resulted in the government's (formally)
"open ended" commitment to pay for all approved certificates when they were
submitted for payment. Although prevailing fiscal policies of government
make it difficult, if not impossible, to argue in support of continuing a system
of open-ended funding, the Report fails to make clear how its acceptance of
fixed budget funding has implications for its other recommendations, especially those concerning a staff lawyer model of delivery. More seriously, the
Report does not question the fundamental impact on access to justice goals
that results when governmental choices about funding arrangements clearly
constrain "choices" about other aspects of legal aid policy, an issue that must
be addressed whether it is the Law Society or some other independent agency
that has responsibility for administering legal aid. In the context of the Report's support for independent governance, the absence of any analysis of the
implications of fixed budget funding on principled decision-making about
legal aid services is perplexing.
In the Report's overview of the development of legal aid services in
Ontario (Chapter II) and its description of the current crisis (Chapter III), the
authors identified three main problems relating to recent developments
within OLAP: increased demands for legal aid certificates, rising costs per
certificate, and "caps" on federal contributions to legal aid costs after 1990.
Although, as the quotation at the beginning of this review makes clear, there
have been many other fiscal crises for Ontario's legal aid services over the
years, the Report accepts without much analysis that the magnitude of recent
problems requires substantial reform to ensure fiscal accountability. In doing
so, there is no real effort to examine critically existing arrangements for
block fees, tariff levels, limits on certificates, etc., thereby justifying the
adoption of fixed budget funding as the only solution without really examining any possible alternatives.
The Report also accepts the existence of a "crisis" in legal aid services in
Ontario. However, although the Report documents the government's determination to achieve fixed budget funding, there is less focus on other aspects of the problem. In particular, the Report does not clearly assess the
impact of the move to fixed budget funding in a context where the government, at the same time, substantially reduced overall funding for legal aid
services without much advance warning, leaving both plan administrators
and legal aid lawyers little time to plan sensibly for such a major change in
of fiscal arrangements of OLAP in the fall of 1995: see Report of the Special Advisor to the Attorney General on Legal Aid (5 December 1995): the Beck Report
[Unpublished].
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funding arrangements. Thus, while the move from open-ended to fixed
budget funding contributed to Ontario's legal aid "crisis", it was arguably
only one aspect of a larger problem created by the implementation of governmental policies to achieve immediate targets of deficit reduction.
More fundamentally, the Report does not address at all the principles to
be used to define the amount of funding that should be allocated for legal
aid services each year. If the amount is not to be calculated on the basis of
the total funding needed to pay for approved legal aid certificates (related,
at least in some way, to the need for such services), how should this amount
be defined? Despite the importance of this question, especially in the context of revised arrangements for governance and delivery systems, the Report never confronts this fundamental question in a principled way. Especially since the Report acknowledges that the number of certificates to be
issued in 1997 represents the lowest number issued in the past twenty-two
years, the authors' silence in relation to principles for calculating the appropriate amount of overall legal aid funding is disappointing.8
Delivery Systems
In contrast with its analysis of funding, the Report's analysis of delivery
systems (Chapter VII) is informed and thoughtful in its assessment of studies
that have tried to compare the cost of delivering legal aid services using
certificates and private practice lawyers, on one hand, and staff lawyers and
clinics on the other. 9 The authors recommend experimentation with staff
8 This question is not, of course, simply one of mathematics, but necessarily involves
complex political and fiscal judgements. For example, the Report's Table 7A shows
1994 comparative statistics on legal aid expenditures in Canada, noting that these
statistics are the most recent available. Three features of these statistics are important.
First, a number of provincial governments began the process of reducing contributions to legal aid services prior to the 1994 crisis in Ontario, and thus the Table
shows only a static picture of what is really a "moving target". This conclusion is
relevant for Ontario as well. For example, Table 3 shows that there was an 8%
decrease in overall costs of legal aid in Ontario between 1993 and 1994, while there
was an 18% increase between 1994 and 1995, that is, after the signing of the MOU.
Clearly, more information is needed to assess the relative rates of provincial contributions to legal aid services than just overall total figures. Second, the "malleability"
of statistics is revealed by the lack of congruity in the figures for Ontario's legal aid
costs set out in Table 7A (compiled by the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics) and
in Table 5 OLAP Annual Reports 1985-1995 (Law Society of Upper Canada).
Although the discrepancy is not great, it may be important to know how the figures
were developed before using them to make arguments about excessive costs in
Ontario. Finally, returning to Table 7A, it is interesting that the 1994 statistics on per
capita spending in the provinces show that British Columbia (whose innovative
programme for "streaming" family law cases is applauded by the Report in Chapter
VII) spent substantially more per civil legal aid case in 1994 than Ontario, a feature
of these statistics that also demands some more detailed analysis.
9 A comparison of the Osler Report and this more recent Report provides a fascinating
study of how research and policymaking may be shaped within a particular political
context. Both reports, for example, recommend a greater use of staff lawyers instead
of relying only on a judicare system with legal aid certificates, and both provide
comparisons of the costs of legal aid services provided by the certificate model and
by a clinic or staff lawyer model. The Osler Report concluded that legal aid services
should be expanded to include neighbourhood clinics with staff lawyers and paralegals providing expert "poverty law" services to clients, but that "divorce, matrimo-
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lawyer and other delivery models' ° that would be cost-effective without
diminishing the quality of legal aid services. Significantly, however, the
Report does not recommend the use of staff lawyers on the basis of their
cost-effectiveness." Instead, the Report recommends staff lawyer models as
a "counterbalance" to the certificate system, reducing "the power of the
private profession to dictate the terms of legal aid delivery through an
organized withdrawal of service."' 2 As this recommendation makes clear, the
Report is less concerned about cost-effectiveness than about controlling
costs for legal aid services. A staff lawyer model controls costs because the
level of service provided is defined by the number of staff lawyers available
to provide legal aid services, not by the needs of poor clients for legal
services. By contrast, a certificate system offers services to poor clients so

nial work and conventional criminal and civil litigation" should continue to be
provided by the private Bar under the certificate system. See Osler Report, supra
note 6 at 55, Recommendations 10 and 36.
The Osler Report's conclusion in 1974 arguably represented a reasonable division
of responsibility for legal aid services in its own political context, both fostering the
development of Ontario's unique system of community-based clinics and, at the
same time, ensuring the continued support and participation of the private Bar in the
delivery of legal aid services to poor members of the community. Although the
Oster Report did not ignore the issue of the relative costs of different delivery
models, its recommendations reflected as well goals of efficiency and expertise in
providing a wide range of different kinds of legal aid services. Although it is clear
that the authors of the Report are similarly trying to ensure continued support for
legal aid services among members of the practising Bar in the 1990s, their analysis
does not confront this issue directly.
10 Chapter VII of the Report provides a detailed analysis of current delivery models,
including the certificate programme, community clinics and duty counsel services,
as well as student legal aid societies and the research facility of OLAP. The Clinic
Resource Office is described in the section on community clinics.
I I Supra note 2, at 151. The Report documents a large amount of Canadian literature
comparing the costs of different delivery models in different provincial legal aid
programmes. Yet, as the Report notes, these studies have not tended to demonstrate
that either model is always clearly more cost-effective:
The authors of most studies acknowledge that conclusions about the costeffectiveness of service models are dependent on the interaction of three separate
variables: the level of tariff paid to private practitioners, the salary and benefit
cost of staff lawyers, and the productivity of staff lawyers. If the level of staff
lawyer productivity is low, staff delivery will not be cost-effective. Similarly, if
a legal aid plan is prepared to significantly reduce the level of a tariff, judicare
delivery may be more cost-effective....
What these studies demonstrate is that cost-effectiveness is ultimately a function
of management - it must be created, since it is not the automatic result of utilizing
one form of delivery model.
Ibid. at 150.
12 Ibid. at 151. The Report also identifies the ability to keep a "window on the industry
to keep track of trends and intentions", and to promote "beneficial competition
between service providers" as reasons for developing a staff lawyer component in
Ontario. It is unclear why the Report concludes that it would be impossible for staff
lawyers in clinics to engage in an "organized withdrawal of services".
Even though legal aid services have been delivered in other Canadian provinces
by staff lawyers for decades, most legal aid services (other than "poverty law"
services provided by community clinics) have been provided in Ontario by privatepractice lawyers pursuant to legal aid certificates. This policy choice has been
justified because, at least in theory, Ontario lawyers provide services to both paying
clients and legal aid clients, an arrangement adopted originally with the goal of
ensuring the same quality of service to both groups.
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long as any private practice lawyer is available to accept a certificate, a
system that makes meeting needs more open-ended, but which makes controlling costs (but not necessarily cost-effectiveness) more difficult to
achieve. Moreover, the role of private practice lawyers in "creating demands" through the numbers of certificates issued or the level of services
provided offers less opportunity to control costs, even though staff lawyers
in clinics may sometimes thwart legal aid service policies by offering higher
levels of service to some kinds of clients or cases, thereby denying service
to others. Such an analysis reveals that the Report's preference for "experiments" with staff lawyer arrangements is not based on goals of cost-effectiveness and quality of legal aid services, but rather on their potential to
enhance the government funder's ability to control costs.
The Report recommends three "experiments", including block contracts
for some legal aid services, case management of legal aid cases, and the
provision of family law legal aid services by a community clinic. Particularly in relation to the latter recommendation, the Report is disappointingly
vague about the practicalities of family law disputes and the work of family
law advocates. It seems important, for example, to consider differences in the
role of staff lawyer services in "private" disputes such as family law, by
contrast with many other areas of legal aid services where the state is a party
and the state's lawyer has some duty to represent the "public interest". Such
an analysis might lead, for example, to a recommendation that the staff
lawyer model is more appropriate in criminal law matters than in "private"
family law disputes. Especially in divorce cases, for example, women clients
are likely to be disproportionately represented by staff lawyers while their
husbands may be able to retain private counsel. This situation requires the
allocation of sufficient resources to family law staff lawyers to ensure equality of representation for their clients where the opposing parties may be feepaying clients, some of whom seem to have almost unlimited resources. The
need for legal aid arrangements to confront the gendered disparity in economic resources and power that are so frequently evident in family law cases
13
is not addressed simply by adopting a staff lawyer model.
13 For detailed analysis of the gender issue in legal aid and family law, see M.J. Mossman "Shoulder to Shoulder: Gender and Access to Justice" (1990) 10 Windsor Y.B
of Access Just. 351; M.J. Mossman, "Gender Equality and Legal Aid Services: A
Research Agenda" (1993) 15 Sydney L. Rev. 30; M.J. Mossman, "Gender Equality,
Fam. L. & Access Just" (1994) 8 Int'l J. L. & Far. 357; and E. Abner, M.J. Mossman & E. Pickett, "A Matter of Simple Justice: Assessing the Report of the Royal
Commission on the Status of Women in Canada" (1990) 22 Ottawa L. Rev.573. See
also Ontario, Family Law Tariff Sub-Committee, "Equal Justice for Women and
Children" (Toronto: Law Society of Upper Canada, 1992) at 3.
The role of the community clinic's Board of Directors, in relation to family law
services, is not addressed in the Report. For example, if family law services are to
be provided by a community clinic, what kinds of family law legal aid services will
be offered, and to what extent will they be "integrated" with other services offered
by the clinic under the direction of its Board of Directors? Should the Board have
the power to define either the kinds of services (divorce, or just support and custody?), the kinds of clients (men or women or both, married or not, opposite or
same-sex?), and the kinds of problems (abuse and violence or only economic
issues?). If these decisions do not fall to the Board for decision, how should these
family law services be "integrated" with those provided under the Board's direction?
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Governance
The Report also recommends (in Chapter V) a major change in governance of legal aid services, eliminating the role and responsibility of the
Law Society of Upper Canada for legal aid policy and operations. In place
of the Law Society, the Report recommends creation of an independent legal
aid agency, Legal Aid Ontario, with a province-wide Board of Directors to
ensure more "representativeness" and with responsibility for overall policies, priority-setting and the operational delivery of legal aid services. The
proposal also includes eight regional Boards with decentralized responsibilities for delivering a range of services encompassing those now provided by
4
With some modest
certificates, duty counsel and community clinics.
changes, this proposal is substantially the same as that recommended by the
Osler Report two decades ago. As a result, it is perplexing that there is no
analysis of the reasons why the Osler Report recommendations were not

adopted.
More significantly, there is no mention in the Report of the limitations
inherent in the form of governance proposed, although there continue to be
differences of opinion about the merits of an "independent legal aid corporation" by contrast with control and responsibility being vested in the Law
Society of Upper Canada. 5 Although no one argues that the Law Society's
performance of this responsibility (particularly in relation to the establishment of community clinics) has been faultless over the years, the Report's
assessment of the Law Society's "conflict of interest" is unpersuasive in the
absence of consideration of any of the limitations inherent in an independent statutory commission. It is true, of course, that many provincial jurisdictions in Canada operate with such independent commissions, but some of
them have experienced problems in their relationships with government.6
Indeed, the U.S. experience with an independent commission provides a
particularly salutary example of the potential for governmental interference

14 The Report proposes that Legal Aid Ontario include representation from govern-

ment, the legal profession and the community, as well as "individuals with both
social service and business management expertise", and the replacement of many
(but not all) of the 51 area offices with a regional structure reflecting the 8 regions
of Ontario's judicial administration. Legal Aid Ontario would have responsibility
for experimenting with staff lawyer and contracting models for providing legal aid

services, and integrating the administration and funding of services now provided
by duty counsel, community clinics and the judicare system. The system would have
a revised (multi-year) funding arrangement with the provincial government (and
Legal Aid Ontario would be required to file both strategic plans and annual business
plans), and a new research and evaluation unit would be created. According to the

Report, Supra note 2 at 6, the reforms proposed will not be "easy or painless", but
would
... result in a better use of scarce resources and bring us closer to our collective
goal of achieving a more effective and strategic plan for providing access to
justice for the people of Ontario.
15 Particularly in relation to community clinics, the relative levels of protection for
"independent legal services" offered by the Law Society by contrast with an independent Board remains a matter of debate. For one analysis, see M. Mossman,
"Community Legal Clinics in Ontario" (1983) 3 Windsor Y.B. of Access Just. 375.
16 See J. Dawkins, "Living to Fight Another Day: The Story of Dalhousie Legal Aid"
(1988) 3 J. L. & Social Pol'y I.
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with an independent commission. 7 In this context, the Report's laconic
suggestion that "Legal aid in the United States is sufficiently unique that a
8
detailed review of American models would not be productive"' is perplexing. Moreover, in light of the need, in the context of recently-expressed
concerns by the Law Society about its continuing responsibility for legal
aid services, for a more thoughtful and detailed examination of this aspect
of Ontario's system for legal aid services, the Report's analysis is disappointing.' 9
Re-Thinking Legal Aid: Policies and Policy-Making
The Report provides (in Chapter IV) an overview of legal aid arrange-20
ments in other Canadian provinces and in England and Wales, concluding
that Ontario is "unique" in its community clinic system and "almost unique"
(except for Alberta and New Brunswick) in its governance structure, as well
as in its lack of a regional administrative structure. It is also "almost unique"
because it has spent more per capita and provided a wider range of services
than almost any other jurisdiction in the authors' survey except England
and Wales. The authors suggest implicitly that OLAP is "almost unique"
because it is "tilted heavily toward a judicare model" (without a staff component or a significant "market-based block contracting" arrangement). The
authors define these features as their "conclusions about OLAP's comparative standing against other legal aid plans" ,21 apparently suggesting that
these features show that Ontario's legal aid system is distinctive among
22
Canadian provinces in ways that are inappropriate or disadvantageous. In

17 C. Menkel-Meadow, "Legal Aid in the United States: The Professionalization and
Politicization of Legal Services in the 1980's" (1984) 22 Osgoode Hall L. J. 29.
18 The Report, supra note 2 at 42. For some reason, the authors are also strangely silent
about obvious comparisons between the proposed Legal Aid Ontario and the
recently-created provincial Advocacy Commission, established by legislation as an
independent commission to provide advocacy services, and then summarily terminated when the provincial government repealed the statute. See Advocacy Act, 1992,
S.O. 1992, c. 26; repealed by Advocacy, Consent and Substitute Decisions Statute
Law Amendment Act, 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 2., s. 1.
19 The Report does not offer any estimate of costs of the proposed system of governance. At present, of course, Benchers who are members of the Legal Aid Committee and the Clinic Funding Committee, as well as those involved in deliberations of
these Committees' reports, are unpaid. The system of the proposed Board of Legal
Aid Ontario, as well as the regional Boards, may well involve some additional costs.
In light of the Report's emphasis on cost-saving, it is interesting that the recommendations about governance, which may increase overall administrative costs, are not

more fully examined.
20 The Report, supra note 2 at 53.
21 Ibid.

22 In light of comments later in the Report about the need to retain the community
clinic system (one of the "unique" features of Ontario's legal aid services), the exact
connection between "unique" aspects of Ontario's legal aid system and the Report's

conclusions about governance, funding, and delivery systems remains puzzling.
Clearly, the "almost unique" nature of the Law Society's role and the Plan's substantial reliance on judicare are not beneficial, by contrast with the "uniqueness" of the
community clinic system, but exactly why is never explained. The authors are also
surprisingly reticent about their conclusion that Ontario has been providing a wider
range of services than almost any other jurisdiction, an omission that supports the

Vol. 16

Legal Aid

response to this analysis, it is important to emphasize the way that underlying values shape choices about legal aid services. As Peter Hanks declared,
for example, "the definition of legal services (what lawyers can, or should,
do) imports broad political and narrow professional values, as well as being
influenced by the class-based experience of the person offering the definition."23 By contrast with Hanks (and others) 24 who have argued that arrangements for legal aid services inherently reflect a society's fundamental values,
this Report seems to conclude that the "uniqueness" of Ontario's arrangements for legal aid services itself confirms that there is a problem. Such a
conclusion eliminates (without discussion) the possibility that Ontario's
legal aid arrangements may have reflected in part, at least until the recent
"common sense" revolution, different values and choices about the need for
legal advice and representation, in contrast with some other Canadian
provinces. Such a position is debatable, of course. The point is that the
Report's relentless emphasis on "controlling costs" has precluded any
debate at all.
As is evident, the issues addressed in the Report are important. Unfortunately, its useful suggestions are constrained by its limited perspective and
its problematic presentation of arguments, problems that make it likely that
this Report will foster controversy without really informing the debate in a
meaningful way. More fundamentally, the Report has not really addressed
some critical aspects of legal aid policy-making in the 1990s, issues that are
also important in achieving access to justice goals, including the goal of
controlling costs. For example, the Report fails to examine the context of
legal aid services in the 1990s and the extent of legal change that has occurred since legal aid services were initially developed in the 1960s. Although the Report briefly mentions the impact of statutory changes in
family law, a serious evaluation of the need for legal advice and representation in the 1990s would surely have to take account of the large number
of other provincial statutes that have been enacted on the assumption that
people (including poor people) would have adequate access to legal advice
and representation. Even more significantly, an assessment of legal aid
needs in the 1990s would have to focus on the overwhelming impact of the
25
Charter on the administration of justice in Canada. In the context of these
the 1990s, the Report's
since
justice
system
very substantial changes in the
for legal
for
priority-setting
failure to assess what principles are appropriate
funding
to
budget
of
fixed
level
aid services and for the "bottom line"
its
recomof
the
usefulness
undermines
seriously
objectives
these
achieve
mendations.
conclusion that their primary concern is one of "controlling costs" rather than
"meeting needs".
23 P. Hanks, Social Indicators and the Delivery of Legal Services (Canberra: Australian
Government Publishing Services, 1987) at 50.
24 See R. Abel, "Law Without Politics: Legal Aid Under Advanced Capitalism" (1985)
32 UCLA L Rev. 474; and D. Hoehne, Legal Aid in Canada (Toronto: Edwin
Mellen Press, 1989).
25 For one example, see M.J. Mossman, "Toward a Comprehensive Legal Aid Program
in Canada: Exploring the Issues" (1993) 4 Windsor Rev. Leg. & Soc. Iss. I at 27 47.
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In addition to these concerns, the Report's characterization of client needs
suggests a lack of understanding of legal aid services. For example, the
authors identify a special category of clients with "multifaceted legal aid
problems". 26 Although it is probably the case that some clients have only
one legal problem at a time (perhaps, for example, some persons charged
with a criminal offence), legal aid clients are notorious for having multiple
legal problems. Indeed, legal aid clients who have only one problem are
probably the exception rather than the rule. The fact that provincial legal aid
services have traditionally failed to address all aspects of poor clients'
engagement with the law dramatically underlines the Report's limitations
in conceptualizing how the law should respond to these clients. Since a
traditional criticism ofjudicare services is their lack of cost-effective responsiveness to the multi-layered nature of poor clients' problems, it is surprising
to see the Report's recommendations for staff lawyer models and, at the same
time, the perpetuation of traditional judicare categories of client "problems".
More seriously, in the context of its own emphasis on controlling costs,
the Report completely fails to acknowledge how pursuit of the narrow goal
of controlling costs of legal aid services may result in increasedcosts for the
overall administration of justice (because courts and officials cannot be as
efficient), and in a diminished quality of justice, a cost that is real even if not
easily quantifiable. These costs, moreover, spill over to government, other
parties in the justice system, and other private citizens. By focussing so
narrowly on controlling costs within the current system, the Report fails to
examine issues that are fundamental for "controlling costs" and also for
"meeting needs" in relation to legal services in the 1990s and beyond. In
doing so, the authors fail to address fundamental issues about legal aid
services in Ontario, issues embedded in the simple question posed a number
of years ago by legal aid evaluators:
The reductions [in legal aid services] forced by restraint have ... re-opened the
issue of whether legal aid is provided under a state responsibility to ensure
justice, or is seen simply as a social need which may or may not be filled."

26 The Report, supra note 2 at 154.
27 Canadian Bar Association, "An Evaluation of Legal Aid in British Columbia" by
P.L. Brantingham & P.J. Brantingham (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 1984). The
Canadian Bar Association's study of legal aid declared that legal aid "is the expression of the basic, democratic principle of the protection of the rights of individuals
against the overwhelming power of the state" and that it is an essential service "to
ensure equal access to justice in our society". See National Legal Aid Liaison Committee, "The Provision of Public Legal Aid Services in Canada: Report to the National Council" (Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association, 1985) at 1. This Report's
emphasis on controlling costs, moreover, contrasts sharply with the conception of
the Osler Report two decades ago. According to the Osler Report, legal aid services
were necessary:
in recognition of the fact that equality before the law, one of the proudest boasts
of nations within the Anglo-American system, was a meaningless phrase if access
to the machinery of the law was denied to a substantial proportion of the population by reason of their inability to pay for it.
Osler Report, supra note 6 at 17.

